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Skilled labor earnings di⁄erentials decreased during the trade liberal-
ization implemented in Brazil from 1988 to 1995. This paper investigates
the role of trade liberalization in explaining these relative earnings move-
ments. We perform several independent empirical exercises that check
the traditional trade transmission mechanism, using disaggregated data
on tari⁄s, prices, earnings, employment and skill intensity. We ￿nd that:
i) employment shifted from skilled to unskilled intensive sectors, and each
sector increased its relative share of skilled labor; ii) relative prices fell
in skill intensive sectors; iii) tari⁄ changes across sectors were not related
to skill intensities, but the pass-through from tari⁄s to prices was larger
in skill intensive sectors; iv) the decline in skilled earnings di⁄erentials
mandated by the price variation predicted by trade was even larger than
the observed one. The results are compatible with trade liberalization
accounting for the observed relative earnings changes in Brazil. They
also highlight the importance of considering the e⁄ects of di⁄erentiated
pass-through from tari⁄s to prices.
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11 Introduction
From 1988 to 1995 the Brazilian economy underwent a massive trade liberal-
ization process. Non-tari⁄ barriers were replaced by tari⁄s, and tari⁄s were
reduced from an average of 42.6% in 1988 to 13.4% in 1995. Neoclassical trade
theory, based on factor endowments di⁄erences, has very clear predictions on
how relative factor prices should change in response to trade liberalization. Over
the same period, a decrease in earnings inequality was observed in Brazil: more
educated workers￿average earnings declined 15.5% in relation to that of less edu-
cated workers. This paper investigates the role of trade liberalization on relative
earnings movements in Brazil, through a Heckscher-Ohlin-style mechanism.
Brazil is particularly well suited for studying the e⁄ects of trade on earnings
inequality. First, Brazil moved from being a very protected economy to an open
one in a relatively short period of time. Second, earnings inequality decreased
in Brazil over the liberalization period, contrary to evidence for most other
developing countries. Third, relative prices have displayed substantial variation
over this period, mostly due to very high in￿ ation rates (the average monthly
in￿ ation rate in the 1988-95 period was 20,7%). This is important because
Stolper-Samuelson e⁄ects work through relative prices changes, and relative
prices tend to be more ￿ exible under high in￿ ation. Finally, Brazil has very
high-quality and relatively unexplored establishment and household data sets.
One crucial step in relating trade liberalization to wage di⁄erentials move-
ments is the link between relative tari⁄s changes and relative prices changes.
This link depends not only on the pattern of relative tari⁄s changes but also
on their pass-through to prices. Even an homogeneous tari⁄ reduction could
impact relative prices when pass-through from tari⁄s to prices di⁄ers across
sectors. We develop a version of Dornbusch et al. (1980), adding to it im-
port tari⁄s and aggregating goods into sectors. The model predicts that the
pass-through from tari⁄s to prices depends on the share of imported goods in
each sector. The model also delivers the Stolper-Samuelson result that trade
liberalization increases the relative price of the relatively abundant production
2factor. We implement this empirically by adjusting tari⁄s changes by import
penetration. This is an important theoretical feature that has been overlooked
in the literature, and proved to be relevant in our empirical analysis.
We perform several independent empirical exercises that check the trade
transmission mechanism, using disaggregated data on tari⁄s, prices, earnings,
employment and skill intensity from 1988 to 1995. First, through an employment
share changes decomposition analysis into within- and between-industry e⁄ects,
we show that employment shifted from skilled to unskilled intensive sectors,
and each sector increased its skilled labor relative share. Second, we perform
consistency checks on the relationship among relative prices, tari⁄s and skill
intensities. We show that relative prices fell in skill-intensive sectors, and that
tari⁄s changes were unrelated to skill intensities. However, by adjusting for
the di⁄erentiated pass-through from tari⁄s to prices across sectors, the trade
liberalization pattern with respect to skill intensity was consistent with that of
relative prices changes. Finally, we apply a mandated wage analysis. We show
that the decline in skilled earnings di⁄erentials mandated by the price variation
predicted by trade was even larger than the observed one.
There is a wide empirical literature examining the relationship between ob-
served changes in skill premium and international trade. Most of it studies the
rising skill premium in developed countries (see Slaughter, 2000). For developing
countries, the literature is far scantier. Di⁄erently from the evidence for Brazil
presented in this paper, studies on Mexico (Hanson and Harrison, 1999, and
Robertson, 2004) and Chile (Beyer et al., 1999) show that these countries have
experienced increases in wage di⁄erentials after having opened their economies
to trade.
A possible problem with the studies for developing countries is the use of
the share of nonproduction workers from establishment surveys as a proxy for
skill intensity. As we argue in Section 2, we consider education attainment
a more adequate measure of skill. Krueger (1997) uses both high education
and nonproduction share measures of skill intensity for U.S. data, where both
measures are available, and obtains qualitatively the same results. Slaughter
3(2000) shows that the results of studies that use either measure are comparable.
This paper shows that this is not the case for Brazil. When education attainment
is used to measure skill intensity, we ￿nd a reduction in earnings inequality, while
a slight increase is observed for the nonproduction measure. This should be
taken as a warning on how to interpret the results of studies for other developing
countries.
A competing view attempts to associate the rising skill premium to skill
biased technological changes - SBTC (see Acemoglu, 2002). One interpretation
in the literature for the ￿ndings of an increase in the earnings di⁄erentials in
developing countries is that SBTC is pervasive in those countries, as in the
more developed ones. Some authors have argued that trade opening can induce
SBTC in developing countries (Acemoglu, 2003 and Thoenig and Verdier, 2003).
Note, however, that, as earnings di⁄erentials decreased in Brazil, SBTC could
not have been its only driving force. Therefore, this paper focuses on the role
of trade liberalization in explaining these movements.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some stylized facts on
earnings di⁄erentials and trade liberalization in Brazil. Section 3 discusses the
theoretical framework for the empirical exercises, including the role of di⁄eren-
tiated pass-through from tari⁄s to prices across sectors. Section 4 presents the
various empirical exercises linking trade liberalization to earnings di⁄erentials
and Section 5 concludes.
2 Stylized Facts
2.1 Earnings di⁄erentials
We put together data from several di⁄erent sources. For the education and earn-
ings data we use a particularly rich data set, consisting of repeated cross-sections
of an annual household survey (Pesquisa Nacional de Amostras por Domic￿lio -
PNAD) from 1981 to 2001, conducted each September by the Brazilian Census
Bureau (IBGE) and used in several studies about the Brazilian labor market.
Each cross-section is a representative sample of the Brazilian population and
4contains about 100,000 observations on households, from which around 330,000
individuals are interviewed.
From the original data, we kept only individuals with positive hours worked
in the reference week in the manufacturing sector and with positive monetary
remuneration. The main variable used is real hourly earnings, de￿ned as the
normal labor income in the main job in the reference month, normalized by nor-
mal weekly working hours. The sample also includes self-employed and workers
with informal contracts. We measure education by completed years of formal
schooling.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of earnings di⁄erentials (in log di⁄erences)
between skilled and unskilled workers in Brazil between 1981 and 2001 and of
average tari⁄s from 1988 to 1999.1 As the ￿gure illustrates, the bulk of trade
liberalization occurred from 1988 to 1995, with minor tari⁄ changes since then.
The ￿gure also presents data for two alternative education thresholds to de￿ne
skill: high-school (at least 11 years of education) and college (at least 15 years of
education). For both measures of skill, earnings di⁄erentials followed the same
pattern from 1981 to 1995. They presented no relevant changes between 1981
and 1988, and dropped from 1988 to 1995. After 1995, earnings di⁄erentials
remained basically constant for the college skill measure. For the high-school
de￿nition, they continued to decrease, but at a lower pace than before.
It is clear that the period of drastic reduction in tari⁄s (1988-1995) coincided
with the period of pronounced decline in earnings di⁄erentials for both skill mea-
sures.2 In what follows, we intend to investigate the role of trade liberalization
in explaining these relative earnings movements. We use the high-school thresh-
old to de￿ne skill in our empirical exercises for two reasons. First, as will be
shown in Figure 3, less than 10% of the workforce had completed college edu-
1Prior to 1988, there were several quantitative trade restrictions and import tari⁄ waivers
that rendered o¢ cial tari⁄ data uninformative about actual trade barriers. Hence, we do not
present those data here.
2Trade liberalization was, of course, not the only event in Brazil during the period studied.
A privatization program began in the early 1990￿ s, while the economy experienced periods of
high in￿ation alternated with short-lived in￿ation stabilization attempts. However, we have
no reason to believe that the implications of these other changes to relative prices movements
were correlated with those coming from trade liberalization.
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cation over the period studied, which is clearly too small a fraction of the labor
force when compared to more than 20% of workers with complete high school.
Second, as shown in Figure 1, both skill measures followed the same pattern
over the trade liberalization period.
Behrman et al. (2000) have shown that returns to college education rose
in Latin American countries, on average, over the 1990s. Duryea et al. (2002)
qualify this evidence, presenting earnings data for tertiary, secondary and pri-
mary education groups for each country in the region. They show that, not only
the skill premium pattern di⁄ers across countries, but several countries alter-
nate periods of rising with periods of declining wage di⁄erentials. A close look
at the data shows that skill earnings di⁄erentials in Brazil followed a di⁄erent
pattern from the Latin American average. We analyze the evolution of earnings
di⁄erentials, splitting the data into three di⁄erent education groups: workers
with primary, high-school (secondary) and college (tertiary) education.
As shown in Figure 2, college/primary and high-school/primary earnings dif-
ferentials followed basically the same decreasing pattern during the trade liber-
alization period. Before 1988, the college/primary earnings gap showed a slight
increase, while for the high-school/primary the di⁄erential remained unchanged.
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After 1995, the two measures took di⁄erent directions. The high-school/primary
earnings gap continued its decreasing trend, specially after 1998, and the col-
lege/primary remained constant until 1999 and increased steeply afterwards.
The di⁄erence in patterns between these two measures can be explained by the
evolution of the college/high-school earnings di⁄erentials, which increased be-
fore 1988 and after 1997, and remained constant between 1988 and 1997. The
fact that high-school and college skill measures diverged after the trade liber-
alization period is an indication that other forces a⁄ecting those variables may
be at play, such as skill biased technological changes and relative skill supply
changes. The behavior of earnings di⁄erentials after 1995 is not the focus of this
paper, since their movements are not related to the e⁄ects of trade liberalization.
One could wonder whether the drop in skilled-labor relative earnings during
trade opening illustrated in Figure 1 could have been caused solely by a rise
in skilled labor relative supply. Figure 3 shows that, indeed, there was a rise
in the share of skilled workers over the same time period, specially for the
high-school skill measure. The ￿gure also suggests that, although labor supply
could have a say in the decline of earnings di⁄erentials, it cannot be its only
explanation. The relative supply of skilled workers rose steadily over the period,
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while earnings di⁄erentials started to decline only at the very beginning of the
trade liberalization period. This suggests that trade liberalization could be a
key factor behind the behavior of earnings di⁄erentials. It is also interesting
to note that the rate of growth of skilled labor supply increased after 1995,
specially for high-school workers. This is compatible with the increase of the
college/high-school earnings di⁄erentials after trade liberalization observed in
Figure 2.
As we mentioned in the introduction, most studies that investigated the
e⁄ects of trade liberalization in developing countries used the share of nonpro-
duction workers as a proxy for skill intensity3. Obviously, neither education
nor occupation measures perfectly re￿ ect skill intensity, which is unobservable
to the econometrician. On the one hand, education attainment fails to re￿ ect
skill intensity when, for instance, a highly educated worker is performing tasks
that do not require skill. On the other hand, some blue-collar workers can have
highly skill demanding assignments and they would be misclassi￿ed as unskilled
workers if one uses the occupation measure as a proxy for skill. The occupation
measure is specially problematic in developing countries, since, as unskilled la-
bor wages in these countries tend to be low, ￿rms are more likely to hire workers
for nonproduction tasks that do not require skills, such as janitors and phone
3Behrman et al. (2000) is a notable exception.
8operators. We believe that education attainment is a more accurate proxy for
skill and therefore use it to construct our skill composition measure in the em-
pirical exercises that follow, although we also report results of some experiments
using the occupation measure.
Figure 4 displays the evolution of di⁄erent measures of the skill earnings
di⁄erentials, using education and occupation as proxies for skill. We present
data on the nonproduction/production earnings di⁄erentials from two di⁄erent
sources: i) the Brazilian Industrial Surveys (Pesquisa Industrial Anual-PIA);
and ii) the PNAD household surveys.4 The ￿gure shows that the two earnings
di⁄erentials computed using occupation as a proxy for skill followed di⁄erent
patterns between 1988 and 1995. The PNAD-de￿ned di⁄erentials followed a
decreasing pattern, similar to that of the educational earnings di⁄erentials de-
scribed above. In contrast, the PIA-de￿ned di⁄erentials slightly rose over the
trade liberalization period.
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One explanation for this di⁄erence could be skill upgrading among the non-
4In the case of PNAD, we classi￿ed workers to production and nonproduction using the
classi￿cation given by Muendler et al. (2004). The level of disaggregation in the industrial
surveys is higher (60 industries) than in the household surveys (21 sectors). The table in the
appendix shows how the data in the two surveys are matched.
9production workers in PIA data. Within-occupation skill upgrading could be
the result of outsourcing of service workers that were previously employed in
industrial-sector ￿rms, a phenomenon pervasive in Brazil in the early 1990s.
In data from establishment surveys, such as PIA, workers that were subcon-
tracted to service-sector ￿rms were removed from the questionnaires answered
by the industrial ￿rms. This may not be the case in household surveys, since
the worker is the respondent and may perceive herself as still working in the
industrial sector, even when subcontracted. These workers are more likely to
be in the nonproduction group, but performing unskilled tasks. Between 1988
and 1995, total industrial employment declined by 31% in PIA data and by only
7.7% in PNAD data, which is compatible with this explanation.
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We cannot directly test this hypothesis due to the lack of education data in
the industrial surveys, but, as shown in Figure 5, occupation earnings di⁄eren-
tials increased mostly in sectors in which there was a decrease in the share of
nonproduction workers. This is consistent with skill upgrading within nonpro-
duction workers due to outsourcing, but it could be consistent with other forms
of selection as well. Nonetheless, the evidence presented above challenges the
10use of occupation wage di⁄erentials from industrial surveys as a measure for
skill remuneration. The choice of skill proxy turns out to be crucial, since the
evolutions of the two measures are very di⁄erent in Brazil.5
2.2 Trade Liberalization in Brazil
Brazil has a long tradition of restrictive trade policies. Trade barriers were built
over several decades, responding to di⁄erent policy orientations. Trade policy
before 1974 was designed as an incentive to selected industries as part of the
import substitution strategy. After 1974, the increase in both tari⁄ and non-
tari⁄ barriers was a reaction to macroeconomic instability caused ￿rst by the
oil shocks and later by the debt crisis. By the end of the 1980s a maze of trade
policy was in place, distorting price, and, hence, microeconomic incentives.
An important question for our purposes is whether the tari⁄ structure be-
fore trade liberalization favored skill-intensive industries. In order to answer this
question, we use data on tari⁄s for 60 industries (PIA classi￿cation) between
1988 and 1995, from Kume (2002). We organized them into 21 sectors to match
the aggregation level of the education attainment skill measure computed from
PNAD (see the data matching in the appendix). Figure 6 shows that the Brazil-
ian tari⁄protection pattern in 1988 had only a mildly positive relationship with
skill-intensity, but with considerable variance. This comes as no surprise, given
that trade barriers were raised to cope with macroeconomic problems, and not
to protect sectors in which Brazil had no comparative advantage.
The trade liberalization process was initiated in 1988, with most non-tari⁄
barriers being replaced by tari⁄s, and it was intensi￿ed by a new government in
1990, in conjunction with the implementation of a regional trade block, Merco-
sul. The average tari⁄ level was below 14% by November 1995, compared with
over 42% in 1988. There has been no major tari⁄s changes since 1995. Table 1
shows the evolution of nominal tari⁄s from 1988 to 1999.
Figure 7 shows that tari⁄s have declined slightly more in the more skill-
5Remember that this was not a problem for U.S. data, as shown by Krueger (1997) and
Slaughter (2000).
































Nominal tari⁄s 88 89 90 91 92 93
Simple average 42.6 35.2 33.1 21.5 17.0 14.4
Weighted average* 43.6 36.1 34.4 22.5 17.9 15.2
Standard deviation 12.6 12.6 11.9 8.4 6.6 5.2
Nominal tari⁄s 94 95 96 97 98 99
Simple average 12.3 13.4 13.3 16.4 16.5 16.1
Weighted average* 12.6 14.4 14.6 17.8 17.7 17.0
Standard deviation 5.6 6.2 6.6 5.6 5.5 4.7
(*) Weighted by the value added in 1988. Source: Kume (2002).
Table 1: Nominal and e⁄ective tari⁄s, 1988-1995
intensive sectors, although not dramatically so, a pattern that will be further
investigated below.6 This contrasts sharply with what was observed in Mex-
ico. Hanson and Harrison (1999) and Robertson (2004), for example, show
that Mexican tari⁄s were relatively lower in skill-intensive sectors before trade
liberalization, and decreased less in those sectors.
3 Theoretical Considerations
In a Heckscher-Ohlin world, international trade is completely specialized, that
is, countries import only goods in which they have no comparative advantage.
Moreover, in these models, trade liberalization a⁄ects relative wages through its
6Nonproduction-production employment ratios in 1988 are negatively correlated with 1988
tari⁄s levels, but are not correlated with 1988-1995 tari⁄s changes.











































direct e⁄ect on relative domestic prices. However, data are usually collected at
the sectorial level, and, in general, sectors are composed of imported, exported
and non-traded goods. Hence, sectors do not present complete specialization
and, more importantly, the impact from tari⁄s changes to sectorial relative
prices is not as straightforward.
In order to investigate the e⁄ect of tari⁄s changes on relative sector prices,
we present a H-O type of model with a continuum of goods and no complete
trade specialization in each sector, building on a version of Dornbusch et al.
(1980) by adding to it import tari⁄s and by aggregating goods into sectors.
The model predicts that the pass-through from tari⁄s to prices depends on the
share of imported goods in each sector. The model also delivers the Stolper-
Samuelson result that trade liberalization increases the relative price of the
relatively abundant production factor.
Consider two economies, South and North, producing and consuming a con-
tinuum of goods, as in Dornbusch et al. (1980), but aggregated into sectors.






interval. Each sector k comprises a continuum of goods z; in the
range [k ￿ u;k + u], hence z 2 [0;1]. Goods are indexed both by their type, z;
and by the sector to which they belong, k.
Following Romalis (2004), we assume Cobb-Douglas production functions
13with two production factors, skilled and unskilled labor, which are mobile across
sectors but not across countries. We assume that South is relatively abundant
in unskilled labor. The marginal cost of production of good z from sector k in
the South is given by:
MgC (q (k;z)) = A(k)szw1￿z, (1)
where A(k) is a technological parameter equal for all goods in sector k, s and w
are skilled- and unskilled-labor wages, respectively, and q (k;z) is the quantity
produced of good (k;z). Note that the parameter z also represents the good￿ s
skill intensity: goods with higher z are more skill intensive. Both countries use
the same technology, but their relative wages may di⁄er.
We assume that South imposes import tari⁄s, ￿ (k), which is the same for
all goods in sector k, but may di⁄er across sectors. South imports a good
(k;z) whenever its domestic price exceeds the price in North plus the import
tari⁄, that is, when p(k;z) ￿ (1 + ￿ (k))p￿ (k;z), where p(k;z) and p￿ (k;z) are
domestic and foreign producer prices, respectively. As markets are competitive,
prices equal marginal cost, hence the inequality becomes:





where s￿ and w￿ are skilled- and unskilled-labor wages in North, respectively.7
Equation (2) implicitly de￿nes a cuto⁄ value for z, z (k), such that all goods
z ￿ z (k) in sector k are imported.8






Equation (3) implicitly de￿nes a good z, such that all goods z ￿ z in sector k
are exported. Clearly, goods z < z < z (k) are non-traded.
7Dornbusch et al. (1980) show that, if factor endowments are not very di⁄erent across coun-
tries, then there is factor price equalization. Here we assume that relative factor endowments
are su¢ ciently dissimilar so that factor price equalization does not occur.
8Note that z (k) is a lower bound for imported goods following our assumption that South
is relatively abundant in unskilled labor, which implies that s
s￿ > w
w￿ . s
s￿ > 1 and w
w￿ < 1
ensure that z (k) < 1 and z > 0, respectively (z de￿ned below).
9Remember that North does not have import tari⁄s.






where d(k;z) is the good￿ s transactions share of total sector￿ s transactions, in-
cluding both domestically produced and imported products, with
R k+u
k￿u d(k;z)dz =
1. pd (k;z) is the domestic price, which equals p(k;z) if the good is produced
domestically or (1 + ￿ (k))p￿ (k;z) if the good is imported. There are three
possible cases. In sectors for which k + u ￿ z (k), all goods are produced do-
mestically and pd (k;z) = p(k;z). When z (k) ￿ k ￿ u, all goods in sector k
are imported. For these sectors, pd (k;z) = (1 + ￿ (k))p￿ (k;z). Finally, when
k ￿ u ￿ z (k) ￿ k + u, only a portion of the goods is imported. Thus, the price












d(k;z)log[(1 + ￿ (k))p￿ (k;z)]dz for z (k) ￿ u < k < z (k) + u
= log(1 + ￿ (k)) +
Z k+u
k￿u
d(k;z)logp￿ (k;z)dz for k ￿ z (k) + u
From the sector price indexes in equation (5), we can derive the pass-through
from tari⁄s to prices:
@ logP (k)





0 for k ￿ z (k) ￿ u R k+u
z(k) d(k;z)dz for z (k) ￿ u < k < z (k) + u
R k+u
k￿u d(k;z)dz = 1 for k ￿ z (k) + u
(6)
Equation (6) shows that the pass-through from tari⁄s to prices is not equal
across sectors. In sectors with no imports (k ￿ z (k) ￿ u), the pass-through is
obviously zero. On the other extreme, in sectors where all goods are imported
(k ￿ z (k) + u), the pass-through coe¢ cient is one. For sectors with some
10We de￿ne the price index as the wholesale one because this is the only price index available
at the sectorial level in Brazil. Moreover, we employ the same de￿nition for the weight of each
good in the price index as in the wholesale price index used in the empirical exercises.
15imports, the pass-through from tari⁄s to prices is equal to the share of imported
goods in total transactions in the sector, that is,
R k+u
z(k) d(k;z)dz, which is the
sector￿ s import penetration.
This means that the impact of trade liberalization on relative prices depends
not only on the change in relative tari⁄s, but also on the di⁄erentiated pass-
through coe¢ cients across sectors. When pass-through coe¢ cients are di⁄erent
across sectors, even a homogeneous tari⁄s decrease may lead to relative price
changes.
Note that sectors in which the country has comparative advantages are the
ones with lower import penetration11, hence, with lower pass-through. As South
does not have comparative advantage in skill-intensive goods, a given tari⁄
decrease should have a larger impact on prices of sectors that use skilled labor
more intensively.
This model also delivers the Stolper-Samuelson result, as shown in the ap-
pendix. According to the model, in order to be consistent with the reduction
in earnings inequality observed in Brazil, the relative prices of skill-intensive
sectors should have decreased, and this decrease should have been induced by
trade liberalization. The new relative prices incentives would have led to a shift
in production from skill- to unskill-intensive sectors. This would have caused a
relative decrease in skilled labor demand, implying a fall in the relative wages
of skilled labor. The new factor price, in turn, would have induced ￿rms in all
sectors to increase the proportion of skilled labor used in production.
In the end, under full employment, one should observe higher relative wages
for unskilled labor, an increase in employment and production in unskilled-
intensive sectors, and an increase in the use of skilled labor in all sectors. The
next section investigates whether the comovements of sectorial variables follow-
ing Brazilian trade liberalization conform to this trade transmission mechanism.
Additionally, according to the model, changes in relative labor supply also
a⁄ect relative wages: an increase in skilled-labor relative supply decreases its
11South has comparative advantages in goods that use skilled labor less intensively, which
are goods z ￿ z (k). At the sectorial level, comparative advantages are not well de￿ned, but
they clearly should depend on the share of those goods in the sector.
16relative earnings. This result is derived in the appendix.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Within and Between Industry Decomposition
Our empirical exercise begins by analyzing standard decompositions of skilled-
labor relative employment shares into within- and between-industry changes
(see Berman et al., 1994, and Autor et al., 1998). As discussed below, trade
liberalization and skilled labor supply changes have di⁄erent implications for
the evolution of these decompositions changes. In particular, we investigate
whether the increase in skilled labor supply could be the only explanation for
the drop in skill earnings di⁄erentials observed in Brazil.
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which are interpreted as:
1. within-industry changes, which are changes in skilled-labor employment










2. between-industry changes, which are changes in industry employment shares







What would be the results of this decomposition exercise if the increase in
relative labor supply were the only signi￿cant change in the economy? For a
small open economy under full employment, an increase in a factor endowment
raises the output of industries that use that factor intensively, and decreases
other industries￿output. This would generate a positive between-industry e⁄ect.
If there is no factor price equalization, as may be the case in our model, the
resulting fall in skilled labor relative wages would shift labor demand towards
skilled workers within each industry, that is, a positive within-industry e⁄ect.
17In terms of equation (7), an increase in skilled-labor supply is represented by
a positive left hand side. The two terms on the right hand side should also
positive, representing the positive within- and between-industry e⁄ects.
What would be the results of this exercise if trade were the only source
behind the changes in earnings inequality? As described in Section 3, trade
opening should have caused a decrease in relative prices of skill-intensive sectors
in order to produce the observed decrease in earnings inequality.12 On the one
hand, these price incentives would decrease production in those sectors, which
denote a negative between-industry e⁄ect. On the other hand, as above, the
relative wage incentives would yield a positive within-industry e⁄ect. With
given factor supplies, the two e⁄ects should o⁄set each other.
Table 2 presents the skilled-labor employment share decomposition results,
using education attainment as a measure of skill from the PNAD dataset. Con-
￿rming the labor supply movements displayed in Figure 3, skilled-labor em-
ployment share (measured by the high-school threshold) increased 2.67% a year
between 1988 and 1995, on average. The decomposition reveals that the within
e⁄ect is positive and the between e⁄ect is negative, that is, employment shifted
from skilled- to unskilled-intensive sectors, and each sector increased its relative
share of skilled labor. Two important conclusions emerge: (1) labor supply
changes alone cannot account for these results, and (2) the results are compat-
ible with the trade explanation.13
Total Within Industry Between Industry
Skilled Labor 0.0267 0.0334 -0.0067
Employment Share (100%) (125%) (-25%)
Table 2: Employment and Wage Bill Shares Decompositions, 1988-95
12Note that we are considering an economy that is relatively abundant in unskilled labor.
13Results not reported here, using nonproduction share from PIA as a proxy for skill, are also
compatible with trade. But in that case, they explain the increase in earnings di⁄erentals
observed for that skill measure. There was an average overall annual decrease of 0.7% in
nonproduction employment share. This was decomposed into a negative within-industry e⁄ect
(-1.4%), which outweighted a positive between-industry e⁄ect (0.7%).
184.2 Consistency Checks
We perform some consistency check exercises to examine the causality path
predicted by trade theory. As discussed in Section 3, the following relationships
should be investigated to determine whether trade liberalization was responsible
for the decrease in skilled labor relative earnings observed in Brazil:
1. What was the pattern of relative price changes? To be consistent with the
decrease in earnings inequality, one should observe a decrease in the rela-
tive prices of the sectors that use skilled labor intensively. This should be
re￿ ected in the data through a negative correlation between price changes
and skill intensity.
2. What was the pattern of tari⁄ reduction? If these changes in relative
prices, negatively correlated with skill intensity, were induced by trade lib-
eralization, one should observe that the most skill-intensive sectors expe-
rienced the largest tari⁄reductions and/or that in these sectors the tari⁄s
reduction had a larger impact on prices. As equation (6) shows, tari⁄s ad-
justed by the share of imported goods in each sector is the proper measure
to be used to investigate the impact of trade liberalization on prices, since
it captures both the tari⁄ changes and the di⁄erentiated pass-through ef-
fect. Therefore, one should test the correlation between skill intensity and
adjusted tari⁄ changes.
3. Was the pattern of price changes induced by tari⁄ changes? This can be
examined through the estimation of price changes equations based on the
relationship established in equation (5).
We investigate each of these questions in turn over the next three sub-
sections.
4.2.1 Prices and Skill Intensity
The ￿rst step is to check whether the pattern of price changes is consistent
with the observed decrease in skilled labor relative earnings. Figure 8 suggests
19that, between 1988 and 1995, relative prices decreased in sectors with a higher
proportion of educated workers.
We test the correlation between prices and the sector skill intensity by esti-
mating:














share of skilled labor employed in sector k. The pattern of price changes must
deliver a negative value for ￿1, in order to be consistent with the decrease in
skilled-labor relative earnings.










































Equation (8) is estimated using yearly observations from 1988 to 1995, for
a sample of 60 industries (PIA classi￿cation). The Brazilian wholesale price
index (˝ndice de Pre￿os por Atacado - Oferta Global, IPA-OG),14 collected by
the Funda￿ªo Getulio Vargas, was matched to the PIA aggregation. The skilled
labor share based on education attainment was computed from the 21-sectors￿
PNAD data set. When this is the skill measure used, we correct the standard
errors of all coe¢ cients for the fact that this variable is more aggregated than
the dependent variables.
14The weight of each good in IPA-OG is given by the good￿ s transactions share of total
sector￿ s transactions. The latter is de￿ned as the sum of the sector￿ s total production and
imports.
20The regression results of equation (8) are presented in Table 3. A signi￿cant
negative correlation between prices and lagged skill intensity (education-based)
is observed in column (1), which uses panel data, showing that relative prices
changed in favor of less skill-intensive sectors. Since there is not much variation
in skill intensity over time, we estimate a cross-section of the changes in prices
from 1988 to 1995 on the skill intensity in 1988. The estimated coe¢ cient, in
the second column, is about seven times higher (in absolute value), as expected.
In the third column, results of an unweighted regression are presented, which
are very similar to those of column (2).
Since most of the empirical literature uses the share of nonproduction work-
ers as a measure of skill intensity, we also estimate equation (8) using that
measure. Consistent with the slight rise in occupation wage di⁄erentials, the
skill-intensity coe¢ cient in column (4) is positive, yet not signi￿cant. Finally, in
column (5) we aggregate the occupation-based skill de￿nition to the 21-sector
level (the same of the education-based de￿nition). The results do not change,
so that the di⁄erences in the level of aggregation do not seem to be driving the
di⁄erent results for the two skill measures.15
These results verify the ￿rst consistency check: there is a negative and sig-
ni￿cant correlation between relative price changes and skill intensity. This is
true when we use education attainment as a proxy for skill, which is a more
accurate proxy for skill than occupation, as discussed in section 2. Hence, the
pattern of relative price changes is consistent with the observed decline in earn-
ings di⁄erentials.
4.2.2 Tari⁄s and Skill Intensity
If the changes in relative prices, which were shown to be negatively correlated
with skill intensity, were induced by trade liberalization, one should observe ei-
15A variance decomposition analysis suggests that about 50% of the price variation occurs
within sectors (between industries) and 50% occurs between sectors.
21Dependent Variable: Change in Prices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
High Education -0.043 -0.338 -0.299 - -
Employment Share (0.020) (0.061) (0.131)
Nonproduction - - - 0.036 0.062
Employment Share (0.239) (0.285)
Constant 3.489 16.240 16.320 16.913 16.947
(0.039) (0.257) (0.241) (0.292) (0.355)
Observations 420 60 60 60 60
Weighted Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes No No No No
Notes: Panel regression of yearly changes in column (1) and cross-section
of 1988-1995 changes in columns (2) to (5). In column (5), nonproduction
share is aggregated to sector level. Sector employment shares are used
as weights. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 3: Prices and Skill Intensity, 1988-95
ther that the largest tari⁄reductions occurred in the most skill-intensive sectors
or that the pass-through from tari⁄s to prices was larger in these sectors.
We ￿rst estimate the correlation between tari⁄ changes and skill intensity
using the following equation:







where tk is the average import tari⁄ for sector k.
The results for cross-section long changes (1988-1995) regressions are pre-
sented in columns (1) and (2) of Table 4. Neither skill intensity measure is
signi￿cantly correlated with the changes in tari⁄s. Therefore, as already sug-
gested by Figure 7, there is no clear pattern of tari⁄ reductions with relation to
skill intensity in Brazil.
According to equation (6), the proper measure to be used to investigate the
impact of trade liberalization on prices is tari⁄s adjusted by the share of im-
ported goods in each sector. This measure captures both the tari⁄ changes and
the di⁄erentiated pass-through from tari⁄s to prices. We, then, test the correla-
tion between adjusted tari⁄ changes and skill intensity, using ￿k￿log(1 + tk￿)
22as the dependent variable in equation (9), where ￿k is the import penetration.
This is measured as the ratio of imports over the sum of imports and total
production in each sector in the initial year (1988).
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 4 report the regression results for a panel
of yearly changes and for a cross-section of long changes, respectively. Both
skill-intensity coe¢ cients are negative and signi￿cant, with the long-changes co-
e¢ cient being about six times larger (in absolute value) than the panel one as
expected. The unweighted regression yields the same result, as shown in column
(5). Interestingly, the use of nonproduction employment share as an alternative
explanatory variable also delivers a negative and statistically signi￿cant coe¢ -
cient (see column (6)). These results indicate that adjusted tari⁄s fell relatively
more in more skill-intensive sectors.
Dependent Variable
Change in Tari⁄s Change in Tari⁄s*Import Shares
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High Education -0.015 - -0.002 -0.012 -0.015 -
Employment Share (0.023) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005)
Nonproduction - 0.002 - - - -0.008
Employment Share (0.039) (0.004)
Constant -0.258 -0.252 -0.004 -0.031 -0.036 -0.019
(0.038) (0.045) (0.001) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007)
Observations 60 60 420 60 60 60
Weighted yes yes yes yes no yes
Time Dummies no no yes no no no
Notes: Panel regression of yearly changes in column (3) and cross-section of
1988-1995 changes in the other columns. Sector employment shares are used
as weights. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 4: Tari⁄ Changes and Skill Intensity, 1988-95
Note that these last results contrast with those obtained in columns (1) and
(2), where tari⁄ changes were not adjusted by import penetration. These two
sets of results together imply that: (i) tari⁄ changes had no relationship with
skill intensity, and (ii) import penetration was larger in more skill-intensive
sectors, which, according to the arguments in section 3, entails a higher pass-
23through from tari⁄s to prices in these sectors.
This exercise establishes the second consistency check for the causality from
trade liberalization to earnings di⁄erentials: adjusted tari⁄ changes are nega-
tively correlated with skill intensity.
4.2.3 Prices and Tari⁄s
We now investigate the relationship between tari⁄ and price changes. Based on
equation (5), we estimate:
￿logPk￿ = ￿0￿ + ￿1￿k￿log(1 + tk￿) + ￿2￿k￿logP￿
k￿ + "k￿. (10)
￿k captures the di⁄erentiated pass-through impact from tari⁄s to prices in sec-
tor k, measured by import penetration in 1988. As we do not have data on
goods international prices, we use sector international prices P￿
k￿ instead, prox-
ied by U.S. prices.16 ￿k, the di⁄erentiated pass-through of international prices
to domestic sector prices, is measured by the ratio of imported plus exported
goods over the sum of production and total imports in the sector, which we
denote trade exposure.17
We have assumed away export subsidies and quantitative trade restric-
tions.18 Hence, changes in the rents generated by other trade barriers should
be captured by an error term, "k￿. The e⁄ects of other omitted variables are in
the time dummies and the error term.
Equation (10) is estimated using a panel of yearly observations from 1988
to 1995, for a sample of 50 industries. The level of aggregation is lower here
because we could only match 50 U.S. industries to the PIA classi￿cation. U.S.
producer price data are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. In order to identify
the causal e⁄ect of tari⁄s on prices, we must assume that the tari⁄s changes
16Note that equation (5) considered international prices as measured by the same currency
as domestic prices. Were they measured by another currency, any nominal exchange rate
changes would be captured by the time dummies ￿0￿.
17In equation (5), we split the sector into domestically produced and imported goods. How-
ever, the domestically produced goods include both nontraded and exported goods, and the
prices of the latter also depend on international prices.
18As discussed in Section 2.2, most non-tari⁄ barriers were replaced by tari⁄s in the outset
of trade liberalization.
24are exogenous, that is, not correlated to other (omitted) determinants of price
changes. Note, however, that this was a period of substantial policy changes in
Brazil. We argue that the introduction of time dummies in equation (10) absorbs
the contemporaneous correlation between changes in tari⁄s and the other policy
changes, which is true as long as there is no within-sector correlation among
these changes.
We ￿rst estimate equation (10) without considering the di⁄erentiated pass-
through coe¢ cient, that is, we regress price changes on unadjusted tari⁄changes
and U.S. prices changes (with ￿k = 1 and ￿k = 1, 8k). The ￿rst column
of Table 5 presents the estimation results using panel data. The estimated
tari⁄ coe¢ cient is positive and statistically di⁄erent from zero at conventional
signi￿cance levels. The coe¢ cient for U.S. prices is not precisely estimated in
this speci￿cation. In the long di⁄erences regression, presented in the second
column, neither coe¢ cient is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero.
Next, we take into account the di⁄erentiated pass-through coe¢ cients from
tari⁄s and from international prices to domestic industry prices, as in equation
(10). We regress the prices changes on the tari⁄s changes multiplied by import
penetration, ￿k, and U.S. price changes times trade exposure, ￿k. Both ￿k and
￿k are measured by 1988 levels. The results of the panel regression, reported
in column (3), show that the coe¢ cient of adjusted tari⁄ changes is also posi-
tive and statistically signi￿cant. Moreover, adjusted international prices turned
out to be positive and signi￿cant.19 In column (4) we use the long-di⁄erences
speci￿cation and ￿nd that the coe¢ cient of adjusted tari⁄s is positive but not
signi￿cant at conventional levels. In an unweighted regression, in column (5),
the coe¢ cients of both the adjusted tari⁄s and adjusted international prices
changes are positive and signi￿cant.
These results are in accordance with the predictions of the model presented
in section 3: relative price changes are positively correlated with tari⁄ changes
adjusted by import penetration and with international prices adjusted by trade
19One cannot compare the magnitude of the estimated coe¢ cients because of the di⁄erences
in the units of measurement between the two variables.
25exposure.20
Dependent Variable: Price Changes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tari⁄ Changes 0.457 0.125 - - -
(0.237) (0.775)
Tari⁄ Changes* - - 4.221 5.173 4.035
Import Penetration (2.194) (3.821) (2.011)
U.S. Price Changes 0.105 1.446 - - -
(0.182) (0.915)
U.S. Price Changes* - - 0.378 2.031 1.001
Trade Exposure (0.155) (1.919) (0.472)
Constant 2.882 16.684 2.874 16.857 16.869
(0.018) (0.215) (0.018) (0.075) (0.070)
Observations 350 50 350 50 50
Weighted yes yes yes yes no
Time Dummies yes no yes no no
Notes: Panel regression of yearly changes in columns (1) and (3) and cross-section
of 1988-1995 changes in the other columns. Sector employment shares are used
as weights. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 5: Price Changes and Tari⁄ Changes, 1988-95
4.3 Mandated Wage Equations
While the pattern of price changes is consistent with the pattern of relative earn-
ings evolution and correlated with tari⁄ changes, we have not as yet examined
how much of the drop in skill earnings di⁄erentials could be attributed to price
changes mandated by trade liberalization. We therefore follow another vein of
the trade literature and estimate mandated wage equations (see Baldwin and
Cain, 1997, Haskel and Slaughter, 2002, and Robertson, 2004). According to
the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, price changes should equal factor price changes,
20There is one caveat in interpreting the results of this regression. The composition of goods
within each sector may change over time, and this change may be correlated with changes in
trade policy. On the one hand, trade liberalization may reduce or even eliminate domestic
production of goods with relatively high domestic production costs. On the other hand, new
products may be introduced due to the reduced cost of imported goods. Even though this is
a drawback, there is nothing we can do to correct for possible measurement errors caused by
it.
26weighted by the factor cost share. If the only factors of production used were
skilled and unskilled labor, it is easy to show that price changes could be de-






(￿logwS ￿ ￿logwU) + ￿logwU, (11)
where ￿
S
k is the cost of skilled labor and ￿k is the total cost in sector k. Therefore,
regressing price changes on skilled labor cost share should yield an estimate of
the economy-wide returns to skill changes.
Our estimation is based on the following regression:







where the estimated coe¢ cient ￿1 is interpreted as the changes in skill earnings
di⁄erentials associated with price changes.21
Since we are interested in the e⁄ect of prices that resulted from trade liber-
alization, we follow Haskel and Slaughter (2002) and estimate equation (12) in
two steps. First, we estimate the change in prices predicted by the change in
tari⁄s. For this step, we compute two alternative sets of predicted prices that
result from the estimation of equation (10): (i) not adjusting tari⁄s and interna-
tional price changes for di⁄erentiated pass-through across sectors, and (ii) with
the adjustments, using both weighted and unweighted regressions. These results
were presented, respectively, in columns (2), (4) and (5) of Table 5. In the sec-
ond step, we estimate equation (12) using the predicted prices, instead of actual
prices, as the dependent variable. The estimated coe¢ cient of high-education
cost share is interpreted as the changes in skill earnings that are mandated by
price changes induced by trade liberalization.
























￿j (￿logwS ￿ ￿logwU), which would be well estimated if the share of labor in total
cost is time invariant. An analogous argument applies for the constant term in equation (12).
27Dependent Variable: Change in Prices
Predicted by tari⁄
Predicted changes, adjusted by
by tari⁄ changes di⁄. pass-through
(1) (2) (3)
High-Education Cost Share -0.048 -0.294 -0.268
(0.039) (0.085) (0.088)
Constant 16.88 16.93 16.94
(0.021) (0.087) (0.033)
Auxiliary Regression in Table 5 Col.(2) Col.(4) Col.(5)
Actual Change in Log Earnings Di⁄s -0.168 -0.168 -0.168
Observations 60 60 60
Weighted Original Regressions yes yes no
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 6: Mandated Wages
The results are presented in Table 6. The actual fall in skill earnings di⁄eren-
tials observed in Brazil from 1988 to 1995 was 15.5% (which corresponds to the
-0.168 log di⁄erence). The ￿rst column shows that the decline in earnings dif-
ferentials mandated by the price variation predicted by the (unadjusted) change
in tari⁄s was estimated at 4.7%, but was not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero.
When we use the price changes predicted by tari⁄s, allowing for di⁄erentiated
pass-through coe¢ cients across sectors, weighted in column (2) and unweighted
in column (3), we ￿nd mandated annualized skill earnings di⁄erential declines
of 25.5% (-0.294 log di⁄erence) and 23.5% (-0.268), respectively.
These results indicate that, if trade were the only change in the Brazilian
economy from 1988 to 1995, skill earnings di⁄erentials would have fallen by even
more (8-10 percentage points) than what was actually observed. Other changes
in the economy were responsible for this di⁄erence. In particular, skill biased
technological changes would have had a positive impact on the di⁄erentials.
Note, however, that the observed labor supply changes might have reinforced
the decline in earnings di⁄erentials. It is beyond the scope of this paper to
disentangle the contribution of these other factors on the evolution of the skill
premium. Nevertheless, this result provides compelling evidence that trade
28liberalization played a major role in explaining the decrease in skilled labor
relative earnings in Brazil.
5 Conclusion
During the trade liberalization implemented in Brazil from 1988 to 1995, earn-
ings of workers with at least complete high school decreased with respect to
earnings of less educated workers. In this paper we present evidence compat-
ible with trade liberalization having played a role in explaining these relative
earnings movements.
First, a decomposition analysis of changes in skilled-labor employment share
over this period reveals that employment shifted from skilled- to unskilled-
intensive sectors, and that each sector increased its relative share of skilled
labor. Second, we show that relative prices fell in skill-intensive sectors, and
that tari⁄s reductions, adjusted by import penetration, were larger in those
sectors. Furthermore, we ￿nd not only that prices and tari⁄s were positively
correlated, but also that the impact of tari⁄s changes on prices was higher in sec-
tors with larger import penetration. Finally, we show that the decline in skilled
earnings di⁄erentials mandated by the price variation predicted by trade, allow-
ing for di⁄erentiated pass-through coe¢ cients across sectors, was even larger
than the observed one. In sum, all steps of the trade transmission mechanism
were tested, and the results are compatible with trade liberalization accounting
for the observed relative earnings changes in Brazil.
Our results highlight the importance of considering the e⁄ects of di⁄eren-
tiated pass-through from tari⁄s to prices across sectors in order to adequately
investigate the e⁄ects of trade liberalization on relative prices. We develop a
theoretical foundation for this through a modi￿ed version of Dornbusch et al.
(1980), which shows that the pass-through from tari⁄s to prices in each sector
depends on the sector￿ s import penetration.
29References
[1] Acemoglu, D.(2002). ￿Technical Change, Inequality and the Labor Mar-
ket,￿Journal of Economic Literature, 50 (1), 7-72.
[2] Acemoglu, D.(2003). ￿Patterns of Skill Premia,￿Review of Economic Stud-
ies, 70, 199-230.
[3] Autor, D., L.Katz and A.Krueger (1998). ￿Computing Inequality: Have
Computers Changed the Labor Market?,￿The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 113(4): 1169-213.
[4] Baldwin, R. and G.Cain (1997). ￿Shifts in U.S. Relative Wages: The Role
of Trade, Technology and Factor Endowments,￿ NBER Working Paper
#5934.
[5] Behrman, J., N.Birdsall and M.SzØkely (2000). ￿Economic Reform and
Wage Di⁄erentials in Latin America,￿Inter-American Development Bank,
Working Paper #435.
[6] Berman, E., J.Bound and Z.Griliches (1994). ￿Changes in the Demand for
Skilled Labor within US Manufacturing: Evidence from the Annual Survey
of Manufacturers,￿The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(2): 367-98.
[7] Beyer, H., P.Rojas, and R.Vergara (1999). ￿Trade Liberalization and Wage
Inequality,￿Journal of Development Economics, 59: 103-23.
[8] Dornbusch, R., S.Fischer and P.Samuelson (1980). ￿Heckscher-Ohlin Trade
Theory with a Continuum of Goods,￿The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
95(2): 203-24.
[9] Hanson, G. and A.Harrison (1999). ￿Trade Liberalization and Wage In-
equality in Mexico,￿Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 52(2): 272-88.
[10] Haskel, J. and M.Slaughter (2003). ￿Have Falling Tari⁄s and Transporta-
tion Costs Raised U.S. Wage Inequality?,￿ Review of International Eco-
nomics,11(4): 630-50.
[11] Duryea, S., R.Robertson and W.Hernani (2002). ￿Regional Integration
and Wage Inequality,￿in Beyond Borders: The New Regionalism in Latin
America, Inter-American Development Bank.
[12] Krueger, A.(1997). ￿Labor Market Shifts and The Price Puzzle Revisited,￿
NBER Working Paper #5924.
30[13] Kume, H.(2002). ￿A pol￿tica brasileira de importa￿ªo no per￿odo 1987-99:
descri￿ªo e avalia￿ªo,￿May, mimeo.
[14] Muendler, M., J.Poole, G.Ramey and T.Wajnberg (2004). ￿Job Concor-
dances in Brazil: Mapping the Classi￿ca￿ªo Brasileira de Ocupa￿ıes to the
International Standard Classi￿cation of Occupations￿ , UCSD, mimeo.
[15] Robertson, R.(2004). ￿Relative Prices and Wage Inequality: Evidence from
Mexico,￿Journal of International Economics, 64(2): 387-409.
[16] Romalis, J.(2004). ￿Factor Proportions and the Structure of Commodity
Trade,￿The American Economic Review, 94(1): 67-97.
[17] Slaughter, M.(2000). ￿What are the Results of Product-Prices Studies and
What Can We Learn from Their Di⁄erences?,￿in Robert Feenstra (ed.),
The Impact of International Trade on Wages, NBER Conference Report,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 129-70.
[18] Thoenig, M. and T.Verdier (2003).￿A Theory of Defensive Skill-Biased In-
novation and Globalization,￿American Economic Review, 93(3):709-28.
6 Appendix
6.1 Stolper-Samuelson Result and the E⁄ect of Labor Sup-
ply Changes
Stolper-Samuelson Result We start by deriving the Stolper-Samuelson
result in the model developed in section 3. This can more easily be shown in
a simpli￿ed version of the model with no sectorial aggregation of goods, that
is, assuming q (k;z) ￿ q (z).22 Cuto⁄ points z and z can still be obtained from
equations (2) and (3). Equilibrium in this economy is characterized by balanced
trade and by full employment of both factors.











where b(k) is the proportion of income spent on sector-k goods, assuming Cobb-
Douglas consumer preferences, LU (L￿
U) and LS (L￿
S) are unskilled and skilled
labor supplies in the South (North), and tari⁄s ￿ are the same for all goods. To
22Using the sectorial aggregation yields the same results as in this appendix, although the
equations are much more cumbersome.
31obtain equation (13), we use the fact that preferences imply that the demand





with an equivalent equation for the North.



























[q (z) + q￿ (z)];
and uses the demand conditions in equation (14) and the fact that pc (z) = p(z)






















Substituting the balanced trade condition into equations (15) and (16), and
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b(z)[z￿ ￿ (1 ￿ z)ls]dz+￿
Z z
z
b(z)[z￿ ￿ (1 ￿ z)ls]dz = 0: (19)
23In this simpli￿ed version, we assume A(k) = 1.
32An analogous equation can be derived for the North. With equation (19) and
its counterpart for the North one can derive relative wages in the two countries
(￿ and ￿￿).
In this set up, the Stolper-Samuelson result is equivalent to d￿
d￿ < 0, that
is, trade liberalization in South yields an increase in the relative wages of un-
skilled labor, its relatively abundant factor. This can be derived by applying
the implicit function theorem to equation (19).






























First, note that log(￿=￿￿) < 0 (see footnote 8), hence, @￿
@￿ > 0. Second, R z
z b(z)(￿ + ls)[z￿ ￿ (1 ￿ z)ls]dz > 0, for the following reason. This expres-
sion is in the second term of F (￿;￿) in equation (19). As F (￿;￿) = 0, either
its two terms are zero, or one is positive and the other is negative. It cannot be
the case that both are zero, since [z￿ ￿ (1 ￿ z)ls] is monotonically increasing in
z. This monotonicity also implies that the ￿rst term cannot be positive. Hence,
the only possibility is the ￿rst term being negative and the second positive.
Therefore, we can establish that
@F(￿;￿)
@￿ > 0.
Finally, the second term in equation (20) is positive, as we show by contradic-
tion that [z￿ ￿ (1 ￿ z)ls] is positive. Note that z￿￿(1 ￿ z)ls = [ls (z) ￿ ls](1 ￿ z):
Suppose that ls (z) ￿ ls < 0. Due to its monotonicity in z, we would have that
ls (z) ￿ ls < 0; 8z ￿ z, that is, for all goods produced in the country. The full
employment in the economy implies that relative labor demand equals relative













0 LU(z)dz = ls, under the
assumption ls (z) < ls. Hence, we would have a contradiction.
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b(z)(￿ + ls)[z￿ ￿ (1 ￿ z)ls]:
The ￿rst term in equation (21) is zero, and the second and third are positive.
We have already shown that the last term is positive.
The fourth term may be either positive or negative. If ls (z) ￿ ls < 0, then
the term is positive and
@F(￿;￿)
@￿ > 0. Otherwise, we can derive the following
necessary and su¢ cient condition for
@F(￿;￿)




z2 (1 + ￿)
(1 ￿ z)
+
ls (1 + ￿z)=(1 ￿ z)
￿ log(￿=￿￿)
2 ￿ (￿ + ls)
#
:
We have that both
@F(￿;￿)
@￿ > 0 and
@F(￿;￿)
@￿ > 0, then d￿
d￿ < 0, yielding the
Stolper-Samuelson result.
The E⁄ect of Labor Supply Changes The e⁄ect of labor supply changes




@￿ , is the same as in d￿
d￿ . We have argued
above that, under certain conditions, it is positive.










b(z)(￿ + ls)(z ￿ 1)dz+￿
Z z
z
b(z)(￿ + ls)(z ￿ 1)dz:
(22)
The ￿rst term in equation (22) is zero and the other two terms are negative.
Hence, we have that d￿
dls > 0, that is, an increase in skilled-labor relative supply
decreases skilled-labor relative earnings.
24Note that, if ls (z) ￿ ls > 0, the sign of
@F(￿;￿)
@￿ can only be established with some
restriction on the behavior of b(z). It is reasonable to assume that b(z) is well behaved.
346.2 Data Matching
Industry: PIA Sector: PNAD
1 Metal Ore Mining Minerals
2 Cement Manufacturing Minerals non-metallic
3 Cement, Concrete and Gypsum Product Manufacturing Minerals non-metallic
4 Glass and Glass Product Manufacturing Minerals non-metallic
5 Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing Minerals non-metallic
6 Iron Production and Processing Metallurgy
7 Nonferrous Metals Production and Processing Metallurgy
8 Steel Production and Processing Metallurgy
9 Other Metal Products Manufacturing Metallurgy
10 Machinery, Equipment and Commercial Installation Manufacturing Mechanic
11 Road Construction Machinery and Tractor Manufacturing Mechanic
12 Machinery Maintenance, Repairing and Installation Mechanic
13 Electrical Products Manufacturing for Power Generation and Distribution Electrical material
14 Electric Conductor and Other Electrical Device Manufacturing Electrical material
15 Electric Appliance and Equipment Manufacturing (including household appliances) Electrical material
16 Electronic Components, Electronic Equipment and Communication Apparatus Manufact Electrical material
17 Audio and Video Equipment Manufacturing Electrical material
18 Automobile, Truck and Bus Manufacturing Transport
19 Motor Vehicle Engine and Parts Manufacturing Transport
20 Ship and Boat Building (including repairing) Transport
21 Railroad Rolling Stock Manufacturing and Repairing Transport
22 Other Transportation Equipment Manufacturing Transport
23 Wood Sawing and Wood Products Manufacturing Wood
24 Furniture Manufacturing Furniture
25 Pulp and Paper Production Paper
26 Pulp, Paper and Paperboard Products Manufacturing Paper
27 Printing, publishing and allied industries Graphic
28 Rubber Product Manufacturing Rubber
29 Non-petrochemical Chemical Manufacturing Chemicals
30 Alcohol Production Chemicals
31 Petroleum Refining Chemicals
32 Basic and Intermediate Petrochemical Manufacturing Chemicals
33 Resins, Artificial and Synthetic Fibers and Elastomers Manufacturing Chemicals
34 Fertilizer Manufacturing Chemicals
35 Miscellaneous Chemical Product Manufacturing Chemicals
36 Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Drugs
37 Perfumes, Detergents and Candles Manufacturing Perfumery
38 Laminated Plastics Plate and Pipe Manufacturing Plastic
39 Plastics Products Manufacturing Plastic
40 Natural Fabric Processing, Weaving, Knitting and Finishing" Textile
41 Artificial and Synthetic Fabric Weaving, Knitting and Coating" Textile
42 Other Textiles Manufacturing Textile
43 Apparel and Apparel Accessories Manufacturing Clothing
44 Leather and Hide Products and Luggage Manufacturing" Leather
45 Footwear Manufacturing Leather
46 Coffee Manufacturing Food
47 Rice Milling and Processing Food
48 Wheat Milling Food
49 Fruit and Vegetable Processing and Canning Food
50 Other Grains and Seeds Milling and Plant Product Manufacturing Food
51 Tobacco Product Manufacturing Tobacco
52 Animal (except poultry) Slaughtering and Meat Processing Food
53 Poultry Slaughtering and Processing Food
54 Fluid Milk and Dairy Product Manufacturing Food
55 Sugar Manufacturing Food
56 Oilseed Milling Food
57 Seed Oil Refining and Food Fats and Oils Processing Food
58 Animal Feeds Manufacturing Food
59 Other Food Manufacturing Food
60 Beverage Manufacturing Beverages
Data matching: PIA vs. PNAD
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